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The Supreme Court and Patents:
Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of
“Progress”?
Simone A. Rose
This paper challenges the traditional “modernist” view that
incentive-centered patent protection is essential to meet the
constitutional mandate of providing exclusive rights for limited
times to inventors in order to “promote progress of the useful
Arts.” For a modernist society, industrial/economic growth is one
of the key dimensions for measuring forward-moving progress. As
modernists, we advocate that a robust exclusive rights scheme for
inventors is necessary to incentivize research and development,
which in turn stimulates economic growth and promotes progress.
This is currently the “grand narrative” of patent law. Applying
this narrative, Congress, the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), and the courts have elevated the goal of incentivizing
research as synonymous with promoting progress. As a result,
what constitutes Section 101 patent-eligible subject matter has
expanded over time to include “anything under the sun made by
man.”
The novelty, non-obvious and enablement/written
description requirements are deemed adequate proxies for
determining what is patentable and what remains in the public
domain, without the need for specifically evaluating subject matter
eligibility.
What we often neglect to explore in patent law, however, are
the societal perils and risks wrought by the modernist incentive-
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centered paradigm. The flaw in the modernist patent narrative is
that by focusing the measure of societal progress on technological
advancement and economic growth, we fail to adequately balance
other equally important measures of progress such as improving
public health, sustainability and access to basic research tools. A
radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to challenge the
incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and consider
this narrative’s impact on future discoveries, humanism, morality
and the environment. The Supreme Court recently took a step in
this direction by restoring a balanced view of subject-matter
eligibility and questioning whether Congress needs to explore
other paradigms for protecting certain patent-ineligible subject
matter.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted
bargain that encourages both the creation and public
disclosure of new and useful advances in
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for
a limited time.1
In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress
has tended to focus on the motivation to innovate
[incentive] side of the balance and paid less
attention to the impediment to innovation side,
perhaps because innovators include well-funded
lobbyists.2
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Founding Fathers took the
time to consider what role the federal government should have in
protecting writings and inventions created in the United States.3
Although many Framers had concerns about the anticompetitive
effect of monopolies,4 in the end, they were persuaded by the
Madisonian view that federal intellectual property protection was
needed to promote both economic and overall societal “progress.”5
The final version of the Constitution’s Intellectual Property (“IP”)
Clause acknowledged this tension between providing exclusive
rights and promoting free market competition by instructing

1

Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 269, 305 (2012).
3
See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L. J. 1771,
1804–05 (2006).
4
See id. (citing debates between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison about
monopolies and noting Jefferson as being a little more anti-monopolistic and arguing
that the IP Clause “struck middle ground between their positions”).
5
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–9 (1966) (discussing the
Patent Right as being based on the Constitutional mandate to “promote the progress of
the useful arts” and noting that Congress should not attempt to enlarge this monopoly
considering the “innovation, advancement or social benefits gained”).
2
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Congress to provide these exclusive rights for “limited times” to
authors and inventors for the specific purpose of promoting “the
progress of Science [Copyright] and useful Arts [Patents].”6
Scholars continue to debate the range of legislative power
provided by the IP clause and whether the “to promote progress”
portion of the clause limits Congress to providing an exclusive
rights framework that will in fact promote progress.7 The
dominant view is that the progress portion of the IP clause is
merely an introductory preamble that fails to limit Congress’s
intellectual property power.8 Interestingly, the source of this view,
Nimmer on Copyright, fails to cite any legal or textual argument
supporting this position.9 Scholars and some courts counter the
Nimmer view with the more persuasive argument that the only way
to give true meaning and textual balance to the IP clause is to view

6

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science [Copyright]
and useful Arts [Patents], by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
7
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 (explaining that the “promote progress” clause is both a
grant of power and a limitation); see also Chon, infra note 16, at 98–99 (discussing the
possible interpretations of the mandate for Congress’s patent power to promote progress
and noting that some scholars view progress “as best promoted through market
competition, while others have found in the patent and copyright clause a mandate for
innovation”).
8
See Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781 (noting that the dominant reading of the IP clause
interprets the Progress Clause as a “preamble of no operative effect” rather than a
limitation); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03 (2004) (“This introductory phrase is in the main explanatory of the purpose of
copyright, without in itself constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act
must be measured.”); 1 NIMMER at § 1.03[B] (“[T]he introductory phrase, rather than
constituting a limitation on Congressional authority, has for the most part tended to
expand such authority.”).
9
Although there are many variations in interpretation, the two dominant views are
that the Progress portion of the IP clause is simply a non-binding preamble introducing
Congress’s broad powers in implementing Patent and Copyright protection. Professors
Melville and David Nimmer have been cited as advancing this view without supporting
citations, yet this view has been followed by various courts. See Oliar, supra note 3, at
1781–82 (discussing four varying interpretations of the IP clause’s Progress and
Exclusive Rights provisions and noting that courts, the U.S. government as well as other
commentators follow the Nimmer view.); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual
Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339 (2012) (discussing the
text and structure of the IP Clause and crediting the Nimmers for advancing the
proposition that the Progress portion of the IP clause is “nothing more than a non-binding
preamble.”).
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the progress portion of the clause as an express limit requiring
Congress to ensure that any patent or copyright statute does in fact
promote progress.10 Unlike Nimmer, these scholars provide solid
historical evidence, structural analysis, legal precedent and policy
arguments to support their position.11
Once one accepts the promotion of progress as a limitation on
Congress’s intellectual property power, one must define
“progress.”By the time the United States won its independence,
European culture was steeped in modernism, which extols the
virtues of capitalism, industrial growth, global expansion and the
development of military power.12 Since the United States was the
progeny of England, it is no surprise that we would adopt the
“modernist” view of progress as developing a strong capitalist
framework, sustained industrial and economic growth13 as well as

10

See id. at 1336, 1340–43.
According to Fromer and Oliar, the other, more persuasive view from an historical,
structural and policy position is that “the progress provision is an independent
restriction.” Fromer, supra note 9, at 1336. Oliar in his article takes the time to piece
together the Framer’s limited discussions on monopolies and the proposed structure of
the IP clause to substantiate the Progress as a limitation view. Both Oliar and Fromer
evaluate the structural composition of the IP Clause and persuasively argue that the nonbinding precedent view is incorrect since it fails to give meaning to the first
“empowerment” portion of the clause and goes against the natural textual reading or an
ends-means relationship between providing exclusive rights (the means) to promote the
end result of promoting progress. See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1339–1340; Oliar, supra
note 3, at 1810–18. The Oliar and Fromer views are consistent with leading Supreme
Court cases. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (noting that Congress should not attempt to
enlarge the patent monopoly without considering the “innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby. . . . Innovation, advancement and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system, which by constitutional
command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed
in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 242–267, (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (adopting the view that
the progress provision serves as a limitation because “too much patent protection can
impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’”).
For an additional argument that Congress’s power to promote progress of science and the
useful arts is not limited to patent and copyrights, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional
Power, 43 IDEA 1, 7–8 (2002).
12
Id. at 55–62.
13
Id. at 58–60.
11
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military power.14 According to leading sociologist Anthony
Giddens, a modernist society includes both capitalism and
industrialism as two of its four basic dimensions.15 In its infancy,
the United States was primarily an agrarian economy, with no true
industrial base.16 Most of its creative expression and useful
inventions came from Europe, or the Far East.17 A mechanism for
promoting the creation of domestic intellectual property would
prevent the United States from remaining perpetually dependent on
the outside world. Thus, it is not difficult to hypothesize that the
Framers’ view of promoting progress envisioned the modernist
paradigm of providing intellectual property rights that would
incentivize artistic endeavors as well as research and development
of the useful arts.18 This, in turn, would stimulate knowledge and
14

See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1093 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 3d ed.
1993) (defining “progress” as “development or growth” or “steady improvement, as of a
society or civilization”); see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITY 55–62 (1990) (discussing the dimension of modernity); ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO POSTMODERNISM viii–x (Stuart Sim ed., 3rd ed. 2011) (discussing what
constitutes “modernism”).
15
GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 59 (outlining the four dimensions that control the
dynamics of a modern society: 1) Capitalism (capital accumulation in the context of
competitive labor and product markets); 2) Industrialism (transformation of nature:
development of the “created or industrialized” environment); 3) Surveillance (control of
information and social supervision); and 4) Military Power (control of the means of
violence in the context of the industrialization of war)).
16
See Economic Growth and the Early Industrial Revolution, INDEPENDENCE HALL
ASS’N, http://www.ushistory.org/us/22a.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
17
See id.
18
In 1949, Karl Lutz began this discussion in his seminal article. Karl Lutz, Patents
and Science A Clarification of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949).
In this piece, Lutz evaluates the legislative history and plain language to conclude that
when discussing the IP Clause’s mandate, the United States Patent System “should omit
any reference to ‘science,’” since this refers to copyright and global knowledge, and
should use phrases similar to: “[t]o promote the useful arts,” “[t]o promote the progress
of technology,” and “[t]o accelerate technological progress.” Lutz, at 54. Later scholars
further dissected what the framers meant by progress and introduced historical evidence
such as the pre-constitutional debates between Jefferson and Madison, the scant
legislative history and textual “plain meaning” analysis to substantiate the “promote
progress” clause specifically limits Congress’s intellectual property power and includes
the vision of increasing our knowledge base and improving the economy. See, e.g., Malla
Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause,
80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001); Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–82; Fromer, supra note 9, at
1339.
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economic growth in the United States, thereby lessening our
cultural and economic dependency on Europe.19 Arguably, the
incentive-based view of patents and copyrights as engines for
stimulating economic progress did in fact contribute to the
modernist goal of industrial growth and improved socioeconomic
status. By the twentieth century, the United States was a leader in
technological development and one of the world’s military and
economic superpowers.20
Historically, the Supreme Court provided minimal guidance on
the progress limitation of the IP clause as applied to the Patent Act.
While many courts recited the IP clause as the foundation for
Congress’s intellectual property power when evaluating
patentability issues,21 few took the time to discuss how patent law
19

Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 119–20 (1993) (discussing how Eighteenth-Century
Americans were aware and bothered by their socioeconomic and cultural dependence on
Europe. Since the U.S. was a “net importer of ideas and technology,” the concept
promoting progress in the useful Arts and Science (knowledge) would elevate the United
States from a lesser-developed country to one of “improved global socioeconomic
status.” Because many Framers feared the anti-competitive effects of monopolies, the IP
clause also provided that these exclusive rights be provided for “limited times,” thereby
ensuring the ultimate enrichment of the public domain); see also Fromer, supra note 9, at
1373 (‘“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ generally refers to the goal
of encouraging the advancement of systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and
technology.”).
Other scholars suggest that rather than having an Enlightenment theory of progress as a
global proxy for “all is getting better,” the Framers as Federalists would view “Progress”
as “a qualitative improvement of arts and science” by the spreading or dissemination of
an increased number of writings or the useful arts. Under this theory, Congress can only
grant limited exclusive rights to individuals when “those rights promote the spread of
science and the useful arts.” See Pollack, supra note 18, at 773–79. Like Chon, Pollack
ultimately advocates a post-modern, ever-evolving definition of progress when making
this evaluation. See Pollack, supra note 18, at 778–79.
20
See U.S. Status as World’s Superpower Challenged by Rise of China (U.S.
Favorability Ratings Remain Positive), PEW RESEARCH CENTER PUBLICATIONS (July 13,
2011), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/2059/-superpower-china (arguing that while the U.S.
remains the dominant global superpower, Western European leaders acknowledge China
as rivaling the U.S. for global economic supremacy).
21
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (stating that
the Constitution grants the power to Congress to legislate in the area of intellectual
property); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.D.C.
2004) (noting that the IP clause grants Congress the power to provide exclusive rights to
inventors and authors); U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(stating that “[u]nder the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress is empowered ‘to

C02_ROSE (DO NOT DELETE)

1204

5/16/2013 3:42 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1197

specifically promotes progress. Instead, courts appear to accept
that as long as the basic statutory requirements for patentability are
met, providing the patent right per se promotes progress.22 Thus,
Congress never reflects on how any proposed amendments to the
Patent Act meet the constitutional mandate to promote progress,23
and Graham v. John Deere remains one of the few patent cases in
which the Supreme Court acknowledged that the progress clause of
the constitution is a limitation that must be considered when
evaluating patentability.24 Despite the Graham mandate, some
courts go so far as to hold that the “progress” portion of the IP
clause is nothing more than an introductory preamble to the
mandate of providing “exclusive rights for limited times.”25

promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.’”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution is the provision that authorized Congress to create
a patent system).
22
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (explaining that
Congress intended the statutory requirements of the Patent Act to be given wide scope so
as to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting progress); see also In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Chakrabarty).
23
But see 157 CONG. REC. S5410 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Hatch)
(explaining that the bill, although not perfect, strikes a balance between providing
inventors with exclusive rights to profit from their inventions and allowing information to
be available for public knowledge and implying that this balance complies with
constitutional mandate); see also 157 Cong. Rec. H4505 (daily ed. June 23, 2011)
(discussing adding a grace period to the American Invents Act); Letter from the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, America Invents Act (H.R. 1249) (explaining the America
Invents Act will positively affect the interests of both innovators and the population as a
whole) (May 23, 2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Dear%20
Colleague%2005232011.html.
24
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (stating that the clause
is both a grant of power and a limitation).
25
In sharp contrast, the Copyright Act contains numerous limitations, such as Fair
Use, that reflect a careful balancing of incentivizing creativity against access and many
copyright cases discuss of the significance of being mindful of promoting progress and
preserving this balance when interpreting the Act. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2006); see also
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the Copyright
Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.
To preserve the potential future use of artistic works for purposes of teaching, research,
criticism, and news reporting, Congress created the fair use exception.”); Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228–29, (1990) (noting that “although dissemination of creative
works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right
to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for
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Rather than engage in a constitutional discourse, courts were
more likely to espouse the “grand incentive narrative” as a
justification for broadening the patent right, noting that patents are
essential to incentivizing research and development and that
without them we would impede economic growth.26 The goal of
incentivizing research and development, then, is elevated to near
synonymy with promoting progress of the useful Arts. As a result,
courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
continue to broaden their understanding of what constitutes patenteligible subject matter under Section 101 to include “anything
under the sun made by man” as long as it is useful, novel, nonobvious and meets the written description and enablement
requirements.27 This paradigm requires elevating Sections 102,
access to creative works.”); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1344–5 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the limitations on copyright protection
follow logically from the purpose of the Copyright Act: “to protect an author’s original,
creative expression insofar as is compatible with general advancement of expressive arts
and ‘the free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes.’”). See
generally Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
26
See, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81 (“The patent laws promote this progress
[from the IP clause mandate] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an
incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and
development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our
citizens.”); see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“The subject-matter provisions of the
patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of
promoting the ‘Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social
and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., concurring) (arguing that
patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes is crucial for continued
innovation and economic growth of the biotechnology industry).
For a scholarly commentary lamenting the current imbalance that results from the
incentive-based grand narrative, see Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 269, 305 (“[Under the
mandate of the IP Clause] there is room to reward innovators with exclusive rights while
still reserving to the public sufficient rights to guard against stifling further innovation.
In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress has tended to focus on the motivation to
innovate [incentive] side of the balance and paid less attention to the impediment to
innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded lobbyists.”).
27
See, e.g., In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (erroneously citing the Supreme Court’s Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that Congress intended Section 101 to include “anything under the sun that
is made by man.”). Like many courts citing the Chakrabarty case for this proposition,
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103 and 112 to proxies for vetting eligible subject matter under
Section 101.28 Recently, the Federal Circuit did just that, in CLS
Bank International. v Alice Corporation Party, Inc.29 There, rather
than making Section 101 subject-matter eligibility the threshold
test for patentability, the court reduced Section 101 to “a general
statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent
protection [with] . . . .[s]pecific conditions for patentability to
follow” in Sections 102, 103 and 112.30 According to many courts,
by broadly evaluating what constitutes patentable subject matter,
we ensure “progress of the useful Arts,” which, as we have seen, is
frequently equated with industrial growth.31 Implicit in this grand
narrative is that, by creating a broad incentive to invent patentable
subject matter, both the economy and society will flourish. This is
the epitome of modernism, which, in its focus on economic
advancement, is frequently devoid of considerations of human or
the Federal Circuit neglects the next part of the opinion which qualifies that “the anything
under the sun” language found in the patent legislative history is subject to the common
law exclusions of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 309.
28
Since 1984 the PTO rules have allowed the patentability of genetic material,
including isolated genes, without citing textual support for this interpretation. The
Federal Circuit later argued that, to not view isolated genes as patentable subject matter
would hurt the biotechnology industry’s twenty-five-year reliance on this unsupported
rule. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Even after the Supreme Court reigns in the Federal Circuit and
reminds them of the significance of Section 101, they are still diminishing the role of
Section 101 to serve as “the threshold test for patentability” and that District Courts can
use 102, 103 and 112 as proxies. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)
(explaining that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the
sun that is made by man, thus, a claim for a physical and chemical process for molding
precision synthetic rubber product falls within the categories of patentable subject
matter); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) aff’d but criticized sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (U.S. 2010); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1064
(Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
29
685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
30
Id. at 1348 (holding that “[Section 101] need not always be addressed first,
particularly when other sections might be discerned by the trial judge as having the
promise to resolve a dispute more expeditiously or with more clarity and predictability”).
31
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (“The subject-matter provisions of the patent law
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting
‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all that means for the social and
economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology,
689 F.3d at 1358 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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environmental impact.32 Such a view of promoting progress is
focused on forward movement and will not consider moving
backwards or sideways to prevent greater societal harm.33
The flaw in the modernist patent narrative is that by focusing
the measure of societal progress on technological advancement and
economic growth, we fail to adequately balance other equally
important measures of progress such as improving public health,
sustainability, and access to basic research tools. This Article
advocates adopting a radicalized modernist view of patent law that
challenges the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress
and critically assesses this narrative’s impact on future discoveries,
humanity, and the environment.
This Article is framed by the sociological constructs of
modernism, radicalized modernism, and post-modernism.34
Sociology, the study of human behavior, is useful to our purposes
because it supplies valuable information about how we relate to
each other, which can be used to help us understand how we
structure various social institutions, including the law.35
Modernism, the current societal paradigm, focusing on capitalism,
industrialism and military power, helps us understand where we
are.36
Radicalized modernism, where society attempts to
deconstruct the perils of modernism, forces us to question the
status quo.37 In sharp contrast, post-modernism is the utopian goal
of a more holistic societal construct, which accounts for the perils
of modernism and motivates us to effectuate any necessary
changes or interpretations of the law.38

32

See, e.g., Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property: Patents and Related
Rights As Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
495, 525 (2012).
33
See Chon, supra note 19, at 114–34 (arguing that the traditional modernist view of
the IP clause’s Progress mandate should be abandoned and replaced with a post-modern
or enhanced view of progress).
34
I chose this construct after using Professor Margaret Chon’s seminal piece,
Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 97 (1993) as part of my Advanced Copyright Seminar.
35
See id. at 10–15.
36
See id. at 48–49.
37
See id. at 150.
38
See id. at 54–55.
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The first part of this Article explores sociologist Anthony
Giddens’ argument that, contrary to many assertions, the United
States is still operating under the basic four dimensions of
modernism: Capitalism, Surveillance/Control, Military Power and
Industrialism. According to Giddens, we have yet to evolve into a
“post-modern” order of multilayered democratic participation, a
post-scarcity system, demilitarization and a humanization of
technology.39 Instead, we are currently in a state of “radicalized
modernism” where we are beginning to question the modernist
narratives in light of views of the past and future.40 The ultimate
goal of the radicalized modernist is to determine what aspects of
our sociological framework are “true” and what should be
modified or eliminated in moving toward the post-modern
paradigm.41 The Article then applies Giddens’ sociological
construct to how courts and the PTO currently evaluate the
patentability of biotechnology and genomic subject matter. I will
establish that the current application of the incentive-centered
patent narrative found in many biotechnology and genomic
subject-matter eligibility cases fits squarely within the capitalist
and industrial growth dimensions of modernism and fails to
respond adequately to the sociological risks and perils as outlined
by Giddens.
The second part of the Article applies the modernist theories of
Giddens and, in the IP context, the postmodernist theories of
Professor Margaret Chon to argue that a postmodern view of
progress is more balanced and constitutionally sound than our
current incentive-based modernist view and should be our ultimate
goal. Finally, I contribute to this discussion by arguing that to
fully evolve to a post-modernist view of progress, we must take the
bold next step of evaluating the Patent Act from a radicalized
modernist perspective to determine the impact of providing these
39

See id. at 164–65.
Id. at 149–150.
41
See, e.g., Constance Lever-Tracy, Global Warming and Sociology, 56 CURRENT
SOC. 445, 453–55 (2008) (citing Giddens’ explanation of radicalized modernity and
Giddens’ discussion of global warming as a product of human intervention, and
discussing the radical modernist approach to global warming and how this approach
involves “asking the kinds of questions about future directions that most sociologists
believe they have now put behind them.”).
40
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incentive-centered exclusive rights on future discoveries,
humanism, morality and the environment. I posit that the Supreme
Court took a first step in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus by challenging the incentive-centered patent narrative
and reinforcing the significance of Section 101’s subject matter
eligibility requirement as the threshold test for patentability.42
There, the Court began to embrace the vision of the “Progress
Project” by acknowledging access to basic building block research
as a fundamental right which sometimes supersedes the
presumptive power of patents to incentivize research.43 The Mayo
court also took a subtler, yet equally powerful, step from a
radicalized modernist perspective—leaving the door open for
Congress to determine whether certain patent-ineligible subject
matter should still be protected under a more limited sui generis IP
framework.44

42
See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
43
Id. at 1303 (“And so cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting
laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more
easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”).
44
See generally id.
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I. COURTS MISTAKENLY VIEW “PROGRESS” THROUGH A
MODERNIST LENS45
A. Modernity: A Background
The one constant in attempts to define modernity or what
constitutes a “modern social order” is that there is no constant.46
Sociologists disagree on what serves as the foundation for
“modernist” thought.47 The Marx-centered view places capitalism
at the center of modern society and holds that class struggle is its
fundamental weakness.48
Others, like Durkheim, focus on
industrialism and the division of labor as the overarching dynamic
in a modern society.49 Still others, such as Weber, start with a
capitalist set of ideas and values yet frame modernity in a
discussion of “rationalization,” surveillance and expansion of
consolidated power or the “nation-state.” 50
Anthony Giddens provides one of the more comprehensive
definitions of modernity. According to Giddens, “‘modernity’
refers to modes of social life or organization which emerged in
Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which
45

One might question why place discussion of “constitutional progress” in the
sociological context of modernism, radicalized modernism and post-modernism?
Theoretically, the value of sociology is it that it supplies valuable information about us
and how we relate to each other, which we can then use to gain control over how we
structure various social institutions, including the law. This “control” parallels the
control that the “physical sciences provide in the realm of nature.” GIDDENS, supra note
14, at 15. This led to researching numerous sociological discussions on modernism and
post-modernism, some broad, some context-specific. Ultimately, I was struck by the
following statement of Professor Anthony Giddens which takes this paradigm one step
further: “Sociological knowledge spirals in and out of the universe of social life,
reconstructing both itself and that universe as an integral part of that process.” Id. at 15–
16. Thus, I posit that scholars should encourage Congress to reflect on the various social
dynamics that frame the construct of our society and then in particular, the law.
Modernism, the societal construct centered around capitalism, industrialism and military
power, helps us understand where we are as a society. Radicalized modernism helps us
question and challenge the status quo, while post modernism motivates us to effectuate
the necessary changes.
46
See id. at 39.
47
See id. at 7 (discussing how classical founders of sociology differed in their views of
the modernity).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence.”51
In his book, The Consequences of Modernity,52 Giddens
synthesizes the various sociological views of modernity and
proposes that modernity is “multidimensional on the level of
institutions, and each of the elements specified by these various
traditions [continues to] play some part [on modern society].”53
Giddens describes the four interrelated organizational clusters or
dimensions of modernity as: 1) capitalism (capital accumulation in
the context of competitive labor and product markets); 2)
industrialism (transformation of nature: we start developing and
using technology to “improve” our surrounding environment); 3)
military power (control of the means of violence in the context of
the industrialization of war); and 4) surveillance (control of
information and social supervision-the basis for the creation of
nation-states, rather than tribal communities).54 Within each
dimension, Giddens encourages us to consider how modernity
continues to impact the following dynamics: 1) the separation of
time and space (abandoning the pre-modern localized society for
the global society that no longer requires physical presence to
develop relationships); 2) the development of disembedding
mechanisms (the creation of symbolic tokens, such as money
economies the abandonment of our spiritual base; our increased

51

Id. at 1. According to Giddens, “[m]odern organizations are able to connect the
local and the global in ways which would have been unthinkable in more traditional [premodern] societies and in so doing routinely affect the lives of millions.” Id. at 20.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 12. Giddens discusses the three dominant sources of the dynamism of
modernity: 1) the separation of time and space (getting away from localized activity and
developing global connections); 2) the development of disembedding mechanisms (the
creation of symbolic tokens such as money economies and the integration of “expert
systems” into our ordinary life, with an abiding trust in science and technological
development; and 3) a reflexive appropriation of knowledge. Id. at 53.
54
Id. at 57–59. Giddens also posits that each dimension of modernity includes its own
variation of the dynamics of modernism, namely, the separation of time and space,
disembedding mechanisms and reflexivity of knowledge. Id. at 63. Globalization is also
inherent in the breaking of time and space according to Giddins and he also represents the
four modern dimensions of globalization as: 1) the world capitalist economy; 2) the
nation-state system; 3) the world military order; and 4) the international division of labor.
Id. at 65–78.
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reliance on experts, science and technology as keys to growth); and
3) a reflexive appropriation of knowledge.55
While this ever-evolving and elastic dynamism had a positive
societal effect within each modernist dimension—we are now both
an economic and military global “superpower”—it came at a
price.56 Surveillance and control developed at the expense of
privacy and trust. Industrial growth came at the expense of a
permanent class system.57 Global communication and enhanced
time and space required some sacrifice of local community and
global trust.58 Last, but not least, industrial and technological
growth force us to live with the continued risks of nuclear
holocaust, unequal access to basic technology, disruption of the
ecosystem and potential environmental harm.59
According to Giddens, there are two sets of adaptive responses
to the perils and risks created by modernism. The first set we can
view as conservative responses and the second set we can view as
pessimistic and radical.
Included in the conservative set,
pragmatic acceptance reflects a willingness to go along with the
status quo.60 It is satisfied with temporary gains because pragmatic
acceptance centers around the belief that society is powerless to
effectuate true change.61 Sustained optimism, or “persistence of
55

See id. at 16–17. Regarding reflexive knowledge, “[w]e are abroad in a world which
is thoroughly constituted through reflexively applied knowledge, but where at the same
time we can never be sure that any given element of that knowledge will not be revised.”
Id. at 39.
56
See, e.g., id. at 7 (“Modernity, as everyone living in the closing years of the
twentieth century can see, is a double-edged phenomenon.”).
57
See id. at 55 (noting that capitalism, one of the two distinct “organizational clusters”
of modernity forms “the main axis of a class system”).
58
See id. at 80 (contrasting pre-modern cultures, “where the local community always
remains the basis of wider social organization” and modern societies where “we interact
more or less continuously with others whom we either do not know well or have never
met before-but this interaction takes the form of relatively fleeting contacts”).
59
Id. at 124–134; see also BARRY SMART, Postmodernity, in KEY IDEAS 12 (Peter
Hamilton ed., 1993) (citing Giddens for advocating the humanization of technology as
key evidence of a much-needed paradigm shift from modernism to post-modernism).
60
See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 135.
61
Id.. Giddens posits that pragmatic acceptance leaves society with perpetual anxiety,
blocking out of reality and perpetual nightmares of an apocalyptic future. “Pragmatic
acceptance is compatible with an underlying feeling-tone of pessimism or with the
nourishment of hope—which may coexist with it ambivalently.” Id.
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the attitude of enlightenment” is the second conservative adaptive
response.62
Sustained optimism reflects continued faith in
modernism and the ability of rationalization and providential
reasoning of the enlightened to minimize risks and maintain a state
of forward-moving progress.63
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the pessimistic and radical
adaptive responses or attitudes include cynical pessimism and
radical engagement.64 Giddens describes cynical pessimism as a
“nostalgia for ways of life that are disappearing or a negative
attitude toward what is to come.”65 The problem with cynical
pessimism is that while it acknowledges problems with the status
quo, it uses cynicism and dark humor as a mode of survival
without any “formula for action.”66 On the other hand, radical
engagement takes the proactive position of facing our major
problems and encouraging society to “either reduce their impact or
to transcend them.”67
Giddens posits that as a society, we are now in a state of
radicalized modernism (“RM”), where we have adapted an attitude
of radical engagement and are now becoming involved and asking
the hard questions about how to transform beyond “the institutions
of modernity.”68 Radicalized modernism acknowledges that we
are caught up in dialectic of powerlessness and empowerment.69
Yet, as a society, we continue to struggle with how we can learn
from the past, consider the future, and move toward a post-modern
“utopia” that is demilitarized, includes multi-layered democratic
participation, and reflects a humanization of technology.70
Unfortunately, in the area of patent law, it appears that we are
behind the radicalized modernist curve and instead seem caught
somewhere between pragmatic acceptance and sustained optimism.

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 136.
See id.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 136–137.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 3, 149–50.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 160–164.
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B. U.S. patent law: a modernist paradigm of “promoting
progress” that fails to address its societal inadequacies and
potential harms
1. Development of the incentive-centered patent paradigm
Under the Giddens paradigm, a modernist society includes both
capitalism and industrialism as two of its four basic dimensions.71
By the time the United States won its independence, European
culture was steeped in modernism, which extols the virtues of
capitalism, industrial growth, global expansion and the
development of military power.72 Since the United States was the
progeny of England, it is no surprise that we would adopt the
“modernist” view of progress as the development of a strong
capitalist framework, sustained industrial and economic growth,73
and military power.74
During its infancy stages, the United States was primarily an
agrarian economy without a true industrial base.75 The Framers, as
enlightened modernists,76 drafted the Intellectual Property Clause
of the Constitution to empower Congress to “promote progress” by
providing federal intellectual property rights that would incentivize
artistic endeavors, as well as research and development of the
71

Id. at 59 (outlining the four dimensions of a modern society as: “1) capitalism
(capital accumulation in the context of competitive labour and product markets); 2)
industrialism (transformation of nature: development of the ‘created environment’); 3)
surveillance (control of information and social supervision); and 4) military power
(control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war)”).
72
Id. at 55–62.
73
Id. at 58–60.
74
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; see also GIDDENS, supra note 14, at
55–62 (discussing the dimension of modernity); ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
POSTMODERNISM viii–x (Stuart Sim ed., 3rd ed. 2011) (discussing what constitutes
“postmodernism.”).
75
See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 15.
76
See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 10, 14; Pollack, supra note 18, at 775–76; see
also Chon, supra note 19, at 122 (“The essential characteristics of Enlightenment as faith
continue to dominate legal as well as other forms of discourse. Enlightenment
perspectives which are still very much with us today include the privileging of
individual-centered reasoning as a primary means of apprehending the world, the
emphasis on empiricism or positivism as required characteristics of any intellectual
project of integrity, and the continual insistence . . . that critical thinking (a more
‘progressive’ way of thinking) will point the way to transformative action.”).
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useful arts.77 This in turn would stimulate industrial development
and economic growth in the United States, thereby lessening our
cultural and economic dependency on Europe.78 With this in mind,
Congress developed a framework of federal patent and copyright
law which provided exclusive rights for limited times, in exchange
for adding this wealth of Science (copyrightable subject matter)
and the useful arts (patentable subject matter) to our everexpanding knowledge base.79
Over time, in both copyright and patent cases, courts reinforced
the modernist view that providing the incentive to innovate is
directly related not only to increasing our knowledge base, but also
to industrial and economic growth.80 For example, in Kewanee v.
Bicron,81 a case evaluating whether state trade secret protection is
preempted by federal patent law, the Court explains how patents
promote progress “through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy,” thereby increasing
employment and making better lives for our citizens.82 Similarly,
77

See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 1.
See Chon, supra note 19, at 120 (discussing how eighteenth-century Americans
were aware and bothered by their socioeconomic and cultural dependence on Europe.
Since the U.S. was a “net importer of ideas and technology,” the concept promoting
progress in the useful Arts and Science (knowledge) would elevate the United States
from a lesser-developed country to one of “improved global socioeconomic status.”); see
also Oliar, supra note 3, at 1810 (citing textual support for the literal meaning of the
Progress Clause as “improvement of knowledge” and “advancement of human
happiness.”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 1373 (“‘To promote progress of Science and useful
Arts’ generally refers to the goal of encouraging the advancement of systematic
knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology.”).
Other scholars suggest that rather than having an Enlightenment theory of progress as a
global proxy for “all is getting better,” the Framers as Federalists would view “Progress”
as “a qualitative improvement of arts and science” by the spreading or dissemination of
an increased number of writings or the useful arts. Under this theory, Congress can only
grant limited exclusive rights to individuals when “those rights promote the spread of
science and the useful arts.” See Pollack, supra note 18, at 773–79. Like Chon, Pollack
ultimately advocates a post-modern, ever-evolving definition of progress when making
this evaluation. Pollack, supra note 18, at 778–79.
79
See generally Pollack, supra note 18.
80
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 480; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (“But a patent is
not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion. ‘(A) patent system must be related to the world of commerce
rather than to the realm of philosophy.’”).
78
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in Eldred v. Ashcroft,83 a copyright case, the Supreme Court cites
its own precedent to opine that “[t]he economic philosophy behind
the [IP] Clause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”84
Nevertheless, the Framers were concerned about more than the
modernist dimensions of capitalism and industrial growth when
drafting the IP clause. Of equal importance was the fear that an
overly broad exclusive rights scheme for patents and copyrights
could have an anti-competitive effect and lead to some of the same
problems faced by England under the Statute of Monopolies.85
James Madison and Charles Pinckney86 seemed more driven by the
need for a uniform federal scheme for patents and copyright as a
limited monopoly that would benefit the public.87 Although there
is virtually no legislative history surrounding the IP clause itself,
some scholars view the IP clause as a compromise which included
the first limitation “promoting progress” by incentivizing invention
and writings to promote economic growth and increase knowledge,
and the second limitation that any exclusive-rights granted to
authors and inventors must be for “limited times” in order to create
and preserve a robust public domain.88 Thus, one could infer that
the “granting of exclusive rights” portion of the IP clause reflects
the Framers’ modernist goal of incentivizing industrial and
economic growth within a capitalist framework.89 In sharp

83

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 214 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219,(1954)).
85
See Chon, supra note 19, at 139–41. Because many Framers feared the anticompetitive effects of monopolies, the IP clause also provided that these exclusive rights
be provided for “limited times,” thereby ensuring the ultimate enrichment of the public
domain; see also Oliar, supra note 3, at 1803 (“Despite the anti-monopolistic sentiment—
however widely it was shared—a majority of the Framers probably saw intellectual
property rights as ‘justified monopolies.’”); Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 37 (“[I]t is
precisely because the delegates were familiar with the Statue of Monopolies either on
legal or political terms that they were not about to give Congress any general power to
create monopolies.”).
86
Charles Pinckney is credited as being the drafter of the Constitution’s IP clause.
Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 25.
87
Id. at 24, 48.
88
See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1331–32.
89
See Walterscheid, supra note 11, at 36.
84
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contrast, the “to promote progress” and “limited times” portions
reflect a broader definition of progress that goes beyond a simple
balancing of incentives with monopolies and is geared toward
developing a robust public domain and ensuring adequate access to
knowledge.90
While the Copyright Act includes limitations such as fair use91
that reflect balancing public access against incentive,92 the Patent
Act remains focused on the incentive-centered narrative.93 It
contains virtually no limitations reflecting concerns for public
access, and it only addresses preserving the public domain through
the twenty year term limitation and basic patentability
requirements of subject matter, utility, novelty, non-obviousness
and written description and enablement.94 This lack of statutory
balance is due in part to the failure of courts to fully explore the
public access and sustainability aspects of “promoting progress”
when evaluating patentability.95
The 1829 case of Pennock v. Dialogue is one of the earliest
patent cases referencing the IP clause’s main objective of

90

See Chon, supra note 19, at 98–99; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292 (2012).
91
See Fair Use, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2012).
92
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright
Act was intended to promote creativity, thereby benefitting the artist and the public alike.
To preserve the potential future use of artistic works for purposes of teaching, research,
criticism, and news reporting, Congress created the fair use exception.”); Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (noting that “although dissemination of creative works
is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist’s right to
control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for
access to creative works”); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the limitations on copyright protection
“follow[] logically from the purpose of the Copyright Act: to protect an author’s original,
creative expression insofar as is compatible with general advancement of expressive arts
and ‘the free use and development of non-protectable ideas and processes’”), opinion
supplemented on denial of reh’g , 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995). See generally Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
93
Matthew W. Coryell, Note, Patent Law as an Incentive to Innovate Not Donate: The
Role of the U.S. Patent System in Regulating Ownership of Human Tissue, 36 J. CORP. L.
449, 451 (2011).
94
See generally 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2002); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2012); 35
U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012).
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promoting the progress of Science and the useful Arts.96
Unfortunately, the Court merely mentioned this limitation in the
context of focusing on Congress’s ability to merely grant patent
rights for “limited times.”97 It was not until the 1966 case of
Graham v. John Deere98 that the Supreme Court articulated the
constitutional command that the patent system must promote
progress of the useful Arts. The Graham Court further emphasizes
that this standard may not be ignored.99
Kewanee v. Bicron100 is one of the few patent cases decided
after Graham that specifically references the Constitution’s IP
clause then goes on to explain how patent laws promote progress
by incentivizing inventors to invest in developing patentable
subject matter, which in turn has a “positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”101 Unlike
Graham, the Kewanee Court failed to discuss whether the progress
clause does in fact limit Congress’s intellectual property power.102
Despite the existence of relatively straightforward precedent
like Graham and Kewanee, later courts were more likely to forego
any constitutional vetting of their application of the Patent Act
when evaluating patentability, and some would go so far as to
ignore the Graham mandate altogether and hold that the progress
clause was not a limitation on Congress’s intellectual property
power.103 Rather than engage in a constitutional discourse when
evaluating patentability, courts were more likely to espouse the
96

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829).
Id. at 17. “[T]his could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make,
construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible, having a due
regard to the rights of the inventor.” Id. at 19.
98
See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)
99
Id. at 6.
100
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
101
Id. at 480.
102
See generally id.
103
See, e.g., Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–82 (citing a series of cases including
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir.
1985), Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985), Eldred v. Reno,
239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111–12 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)).
97
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“grand incentive narrative” that we must broadly evaluate the
patent right since patents are essential to incentivizing research and
development (“R&D”) and that without them we would impede
economic growth.104 The goal of incentivizing R&D is then
imbued with as much value as the promotion of the progress of the
useful Arts. As a result, with respect to new technologies, courts
and the PTO continued to broaden what constitutes patent eligible
subject matter under Section 101 to include “everything under the
sun as long as it is made by man” that is useful, novel, non-obvious
and meets the written description and enablement requirements.105
This paradigm requires elevating Sections 102, 103 and 112 to
proxies for vetting eligible subject matter under Section 101.106
This was recently done by the Federal Circuit in CLS Bank
International. v. Alice.107 There, rather than making Section 101
104
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480–81 (“The patent laws promote this
progress [from the IP clause mandate] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period
as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research,
and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our
citizens.”); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The subjectmatter provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the
constitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts’ with all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”);
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1358–81 (2011) (Moore, J.,
concurring) (arguing that patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes
is crucial for continued innovation and economic growth of the biotechnology industry).
For a scholarly commentary lamenting the current imbalance that results from the
incentive-based grand narrative see Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 305 (“[Under the
mandate of the IP Clause] . . . there is room to reward innovators with exclusive rights
while still reserving to the public sufficient rights to guard against stifling further
innovation. In recent attempts to strike the balance, Congress has tended to focus on the
motivation to innovate [incentive] side of the balance and paid less attention to the
impediment to innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded
lobbyists.”).
105
See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526, 1545 (1994); see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
106
Since 1984, the PTO rules have allowed the patentability of genetic material,
including isolated genes, without citing textual support for this interpretation. Later, the
Federal Circuit argued that to not view isolated genes as patentable subject matter would
hurt the biotechnology industry’s 25-year reliance on this unsupported rule. See Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1358–81 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
107
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (2012).
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subject-matter eligibility the threshold test for patentability, the
court reduced Section 101 to “a general statement of the type of
subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.’ Specific conditions for
patentability follow” in Sections 102, 103 and 112.108 According
to many courts, by broadly evaluating what constitutes patentable
subject matter, we ensure “progress of the useful arts,” which, as
we have seen, is frequently equated with industrial growth.109
2. The problem with the incentive–centered patent narrative
Arguably, the incentive-centered view of patents and
copyrights as engines for stimulating economic progress did in fact
contribute to the modernist goals of developing a strong capitalist
framework and stimulating industrial and technological growth.110
By the twentieth century, the United States was a leader in
technological development and one of the world’s military and
economic superpowers.111 Also, the globalization of technology
motivated the United States, and its fellow members of the Paris
and Berne Conventions, to advocate for a global intellectual
property treaty.112 In 1994, the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was enacted.113
Article 27.1 of TRIPS requires member states to provide uniform
patent rights across technologies.114 Having uniform patent
108

Id. at 1348.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
110
See Walterscheid, supra note 11.
111
Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe see the
REV.
at
5–6,
(June-July
2002)
world
differently,
POL’Y
http://msuweb.montclair.edu/~lebelp/RKaganPowerAndWeakness2002.pdf (explaining
that after the Cold War, “America’s military power and particularly its ability to project
that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented”).
112
SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 164
(2003).
113
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, in
The Legal Texts; The Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). As part of the TRIPS agreement, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was established to enforce international trade agreements and
TRIPS. SUSAN K. SELL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9
(2003).
114
TRIPS at art. 5.
109
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protection among member states creates a global disincentive to
infringe patented products that were placed into the global stream
of commerce.115
What we often neglect to explore in patent law, however, are
the societal perils and risks wrought by the modernist incentivecentered paradigm.
Arguably, the over-patenting of basic
technology creates the risk that downstream research and
development will be impeded.116 The failure to “humanize”
technology results in a patent system entrenched in a capitalist
framework where incentivizing equals industrial/economic growth
and individuals can be priced out of access to patented
products/processes, such as pharmaceuticals and genetic testing.117
Also, since the patent narrative is devoid of any meaningful
evaluation of potential environmental harms and sustainability
concerns, we are currently facing these risks both globally and in
the United States.118

115
See Todd Rowe, Global Technology Protection: Moving Past the Treaty, 4 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 138 (2000) (explaining that the development of international
intellectual property treaties is largely the work of American negotiators working with
foreign negotiators in the hopes of crafting treaties which all members of the treaties can
abide by in order to discourage patent infringement on a global scale); see also Marshall
J. Welch, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 1 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 41,
50 (1992) (discussing the United States’ attempts to compel nations involved in piracy to
treat intellectual property owners fairly).
116
See Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO,
689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 2010-1406) 2012 WL 2215682 at *10–11 (explaining that
over patenting may impeded follow up and basic research); see also SECRETARY’S
ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT
ACCESS
TO
GENETIC
TESTING
(2010)
at
53–54
available
at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf; Heidi L.
Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human
Genome 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16213, 2010) (noting
that patenting genes had “persistent negative effects on subsequent scientific research”).
117
See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 164 (advocating for a move beyond modern
capitalism and identifying humanization of technology as one of four elements of a postmodern society).
118
See, e.g., Shawn J. Kolitch, The Proper Scope of Patentability in International Law,
11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 149, 163–65 (2007) (noting that U.S. patent law requires patents
to be granted without consideration of possible and often well recognized environmental
harms); Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 123, 137
(advocating for expedited review of patents regarding socially (particularly
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Applying the Giddens framework, the best response to
addressing these “perils of modernism” is for Congress and the
courts to radically engage in a constitutional and public-policy
discourse on how to structure and interpret patent law in a way
that best meets the constitutional mandate of promoting a balanced
concept of progress. Unfortunately, courts and Congress seem to
be trapped between the “status quo” constructs of pragmatic
acceptance and sustained optimism. In some instances, courts
applying sustained optimism use the incentive-centered narrative
to persuade us that the modernist paradigm is working and the
incentive-centered narrative is in fact minimizing risks (by
adequately balancing incentive and preserving access) and
maintaining a state of forward-moving progress.119 Other times,
courts and Congress appear to operate in a state of pragmatic
acceptance where they feel forced to accept the status quo resulting
from the incentive-centered narrative and applaud temporary steps
forward, such as enacting Section 27 of the America Invents Act,
requiring the PTO to study the effect of exclusive licenses on
genetic diagnostic testing activity.120 This cycle of pragmatic
acceptance and sustained optimism is reflected in the Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit’s evaluation of Section 101 subjectmatter eligibility for areas of new technologies, such as computerimplemented business methods121 and biotechnology.122

environmentally) beneficial technologies to address sustainability concerns such as
climate change).
119
157 CONG. REC. H4420-06 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Wasserman
Schultz) 2011 WL 2472415 (proposing that the AIA included a limitation allowing for
use of patented material for genetic testing). Unfortunately this proposal was later
withdrawn and replaced with a requirement that the USPTO conduct a study on the
impact of exclusive licenses for genetic material on the public.
120
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 27(a), 125 Stat. 284,
338 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.)
121
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341 (2012); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and no Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the
Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1289, 1307 (2011).
122
See Menell, supra note 121, at 1307; Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter
Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 408–11 (2011).
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II. SECTION 101 SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES: THE INCENTIVE-CENTERED NARRATIVE OF
MODERNISM DISRUPTS THE BOUNDARIES OF PATENTABILITY
[T]he lack of a clear roadmap for determining the
boundaries of patentability, the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to weigh in on these questions in a timely
manner, the Federal Circuit’s inclination toward
expansive
patentable
subject
matter,
the
incoherence and vagueness of the Supreme Court’s
opinions, and the constitutional and political
impediments to legislative action on patent reform
have inclined the system reflexively toward
expansive patentable subject matter whether or not
it comports with good policy or constitutional,
jurisprudential, and statutory limits.
. . . [This] reflects the confluence of two
powerful independent forces. The opening of vast
new technological fields—as has occurred in digital
technology
and
biotechnology—presents
unprecedented challenges to jurists . . . .123

A. Introduction
Despite the fact that we are now on our third variation of the
federal patent statute,124 the text outlining what constitutes patenteligible subject matter remains the same. In both the 1952 Patent
Act and America Invents Acts (“AIA”),125 Section 101 provides:
Whoever discovers any new and useful, process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may
123

See Menell, supra note 121, at 1307.
See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2000)); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29,
§ 27(a), 125 Stat. 284, 338 (2011).
125
Note that original patent act contained virtually the same language, but with minor
differences.
124
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obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.126
Ironically, unlike the Copyright Act which specifically outlines
excluded subject matter,127 each iteration of the Patent Act fails to
address its exclusions. Instead, we must rely on common law for
guidance as to what constitutes patent-ineligible subject matter.
While the law is clear that the three main categories of excluded
subject matter are laws of nature, scientific principles, and abstract
ideas,128 there is little consistency on what guidelines courts should
apply when determining if an invention falls within one of these
three classes of patent-ineligible subject matter. What further
complicated matters is that true to our modernist roots, developers
of new technologies often assumed that a robust patent portfolio
was crucial for effectively competing in industry, attracting
investors and economic growth.129 As noted by Peter Menell, “[a]s
these investments [in patents] increased, industry players had more

126

35 U.S.C. § 101.
See 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2541–98 (1976)
(codified as 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2010) (West)). Section 102(b) states that “[i]n no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”
128
See LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (cited by numerous cases, including
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“For patents cannot
issue for the discovery of the phenomenon of nature.”); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
129
See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305; see also ERNST & YOUNG , BEYOND BORDERS
GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 30 (2011) (noting that the biotech industry experienced
upper double-digit growth for the second half); see also id. (noting that smaller biotech
companies continued to grow at close to high double-digit rates for the last half). See
ERNST & YOUNG, Despite Renewed Growth in 2010, Biotech Industry Faces R&D
Challenges
(June
14,
20111),
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/NewsRELEASES/Beyond-borders_global-biotechnology-report-2011; see also Rob Waters,
Boom Times for Genomics Startups, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17, 2011). See
Justin Kuepper, Regenerative Medicine Starts to Attract Attention from Investors,
BIOTECH STOCK TRADER (July 26, 2011), http://biotechstocktrader.com/regenerativemedicine-starts-to-attract-attention-from-investors-266/ (providing cited statistics and
noting that “regenerative medicine will cause a paradigm shift in drug discovery and
medicine”).
127
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to lose from court decisions erasing those investments, even if the
industry’s trajectory was brighter without patents.”130
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court as to the
subject-matter boundaries, the incentive-centered paradigm of
“more patents, more innovation” and economic growth131 led to a
patent-centric view, with patent lawyers leading the charge for
corporate, industry and trade-policy groups.132 Since modernism
centers on capitalism and industrial growth, one must agree with
Menell that the patent-centric view was destined to and indeed
ultimately permeated “the executive, legislative and judicial
arenas.”133 For courts, this resulted in an unprecedented expansion
of the boundaries of subject matter for emerging technologies such
as software, computer-implemented business methods and
biotechnology. Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit was often the
pro-patentee court that expanded the subject-matter boundaries
with sustained optimism.134 Until recently, the Supreme Court’s
130

See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305.
Menell describes this modernist platform as “more patents equal more innovation.”
Id. He also argues that “public choice theory and empirical evidence suggest that the
Federal Circuit, as a court specializing in patent adjudication would be pro-patentee and
inclined toward expanding the scope of patentable subject matter.” Id. The recent line of
biotechnology cases decided by the Federal Circuit, such as Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology and Mayo, as well as the latest computer implemented business method case
CLS Bank Int’l, seem to support the pro-patent view of the Federal Circuit when deciding
subject matter eligibility cases; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 192, 193 (Lucie
Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (expressing the view that the continued
patenting of upstream bioproducts, which are more like scientific principles than
inventions, is a prime example of the Federal Circuit’s patent dominated view on
innovation”).
132
See Menell, supra note 121, at 1305
133
Id. at 1306 (citing and quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 217 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972),
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978), and Diehr, “‘the spokesmen for the organized
patent bar have uniformly favored patentability and industry representatives have taken
positions properly motivated by their economic self-interests,’ and that ‘[n]ot
withstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the
software industry, commentators have noted that this industry is growing by leaps and
bounds without it’”).
134
See also Menell, supra note 121, at 1305 (arguing that “public choice theory and
empirical evidence suggest that the Federal Circuit, as a court specializing in patent
adjudication, would be pro-patentee and inclined toward expanding the scope of
131
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response on appeal was one of pragmatic acceptance of the Federal
Circuit’s modernist views.135 A review of some key subject matter
eligibility cases in the rapidly expanding biotechnology and
genomics areas will shed some light on this trend.136
B. The PTO and the courts expand the boundaries of subject
matter eligibility to broaden the patentability of biotechnology
and genomic subject matter137
In Funk Brothers v. Kalo,138 the Supreme Court held that a
novel mixture of several naturally-occurring species of bacteria
remained an unpatentable “work of nature.”139 Although the

patentable subject matter”). Id. at 1306–07. The recent line of biotechnology cases
decided by the Federal Circuit, such as Ass’n for Molecular Pathology and Mayo, as well
as the latest computer implemented business method case CLS Bank Int’l, seem to
support the pro-patent view of the Federal Circuit when deciding subject matter eligibility
cases.
135
See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006)
(Supreme Court majority declines to hear appeal). But see id. at 126–27(Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
136
I will not discuss the software cases since numerous scholars have discussed the
trilogy of Gottschalk, Parker, and Diehr, as illustrative of the Supreme Court’s trajectory
towards broadening what constitutes patentable subject matter under Section 101 in the
area of software. Initially, in Gottschalk, the court found the binary-conversion software
to be a patent-ineligible algorithm. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). Here,
the court cites the necessity of keeping mathematical formulas in the public domain as a
basis for drawing its boundaries. Id. at 71–72. Later in Parker, the court utilizes the same
principle to hold that software which calculated updated alarm limits was patentineligible since it was no more than an integration of the algorithm into a formula could
not elevate it to patent-eligible subject matter. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978).
Yet, four years later, a sharply divided court broadened the boundaries of subject-matter
eligibility by distinguishing that if the process utilizing the algorithm/program results in
physical and chemical transformation-it falls within Section 101 patent-eligible subject
matter. See Menell, supra note 121, at 18; Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with
Intellectual Property Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 76–80
(2011).
137
Other scholars have outlined the broadening of patentable subject matter in the
computer implemented business method cases such as State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and the confusion and inconsistency in analyzing subjectmatter eligibility cases such as Bilski. See generally Lemley, Risch, Sichelman &
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); see also Menell,, supra note
121.
138
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
139
See id. at 131 (1948).
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patentee had manipulated and mixed several species of noninhibitive root-nodule bacteria, the Court reasoned that the end
product was a patent-ineligible product of nature because the
human intervention did not result in a product biologically
different from its naturally-occurring counterparts.140 In 1984, the
Supreme Court was faced with a new dilemma in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty. There, the patented product was bacterium that had
been genetically altered to break down crude oil material.141 Since
Funk was controlling precedent, the Court had to compare the
Funk and Chakrabarty inventions to determine if Chakrabarty’s
was distinguishable as patentable subject matter.142
The Chakrabarty Court begins the discussion by placing the IP
Clause’s progress mandate in the modernist context of equating
progress with socioeconomic growth.143 More specifically, it cites
Kewanee144 for establishing that the “exclusive rights for limited
times” provided by patent law promotes progress and has a
positive effect on society by increasing the number of products
entering into the economy and also increasing employment,
thereby improving our overall quality of life.145 Later, when
addressing the petitioner’s argument that the policy-balancing
necessary to determine whether genetically engineered organisms
are patentable is best left to Congress, the Court again focuses on
incentive-centered progress by opining that Section 101 is “cast in
broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all
that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by
Jefferson.”146
140

Id. (“The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature originally
provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”).
141
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
142
Id. at 310.
143
Id. at 307.
144
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
145
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307 (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (“The authority of
Congress is exercised in the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a
positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of
manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and
better lives for our citizens.’”)).
146
Id. at 315.
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Nevertheless, the Chakrabarty court reached the right result in
holding that the genetically engineered bacterium qualifies as
patent-eligible subject matter. The Court correctly reasoned that
unlike the mixture in Funk, “the [Chakrabarty] patentee has
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature . . . . His discovery is not nature’s
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter
under § 101.”147
Arguably, because the Chakrabarty Court based its analysis on
the incentive-driven version of progress, it felt no need to engage
in equally helpful policy discussions concerning the value of
Chakrabarty’s bacterium to addressing environmental harms, such
as crude oil spills. This would have facilitated a broader vision of
drawing patentability boundaries and a more balanced vision of
promoting progress.148 Instead, the Court is probably best known
for its partial and misleading quote that “Congress intended
statutory subject matter to include anything under the sun that is
made by man.”149 While the Federal Circuit has repeatedly used
this quote to diminish Section 101’s subject matter requirements
and limitations, the Chakrabarty Court made it clear in its opinion
that the patentability of “anything under the sun that is made by
man” language was subject to the exclusions of laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.150 Unfortunately, the
Chakrabarty Court’s sustained optimism that later courts and the
PTO would thoroughly apply Supreme Court precedent and
carefully evaluate Section 101 as a threshold matter was not to be
realized.
147

Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
Instead, the court gave little weight to the Petitioner’s arguments concerning the
dangers of patenting genetic research in general and the broader policy issues, such as the
parade of horribles that might result from the patenting of genetically engineered
organisms. The Court was emphatic that it was up to Congress, rather than the Supreme
Court, to evaluate such policies and determine whether specific limitations should be
placed in the Patent Act; without this the Court should interpret Section 101. Id. at 316–
17.
149
Id. at 309. As pointed out by many commentators and a few courts, the Committee
Report quoted went on to include the limitation that anything under the sun made by man
is subject to Section 101 and the remaining requirements of the Patent Act. See S. REP.
NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
150
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
148
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For example, in 2001 the PTO used the Chakrabarty
“everything under the sun made by man is patentable” sentiment,
without any detailed legal analysis or limitations, to sweepingly
assert in its Examination Guidelines that isolated genes constitute
patent-eligible subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act
because “an isolated an purified DNA molecule . . . does not occur
in that isolated [chemical] form in nature.”151 According to the
Guidelines, isolated genes are patentable as chemical compounds
under Section 101, if they meet the other statutory criteria for
patentability (Sections 102, 103 and 112).152
The Federal Circuit adopted the PTO Guidelines view of
isolated genes as “chemical compounds,”153 rather than “biological
information,” and concluded that the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2
isolated genes constituted patent-eligible subject matter.154 In
Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (commonly known as the Myriad case),155 Judge
Lourie, writing for the majority, held that the isolated genes and
the human-engineered isolated cDNA gene sequences were patenteligible subject matter.156 He reasoned that the breaking of
151

See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). In fact,
since the 1980s the PTO has issued over 2,600 gene patents claiming “isolated DNA” and
over 40,000 DNA related patents. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d
1329, 1333 (2011). In her concurring opinion, Judge Kimberly Moore also cited Federal
Circuit cases that affirmed the “chemical compound” view of isolated DNA, such as
Amgen, Inc. v. Chaugai Pharm. Co., which affirmed the validity for a patent claiming “a
purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encoding
human erythropoietin.”.Id. at 1344 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chaugai Pharm. Co., 927
F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
152
See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1096.
153
The genes as information view was espoused by the lower court and Judge Bryson
in his Federal Circuit dissent in part. For an article discussing the opposing scientific and
legal scholarly views of genes as information v. chemical compounds, see Allen K. Yu,
Within Subject Matter Eligibility, a Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 410
(2011).
154
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1332 (majority notes that the
“decision that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible comports with the longstanding
practice of the PTO”).
155
The case is referred to as the “Myriad” case since the exclusive licensee of the
patent was Myriad Genetics, who ultimately was the respondent when the petition for
certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.
156
Id. at 1328. The Federal Circuit applying Bilski v. Kappos, reversed the lower court
on the method claims in Myriad, finding that all but one was patentable. Invalidity was
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chemical bonds during the isolation process produces genetic
material that constitutes a “distinct chemical entity” which is
markedly different from the original product of nature.157 Because
isolated genes and gene sequences are markedly different from
their naturally-occurring counterparts (they are smaller and
chemically-altered), they qualify as patent-eligible subject matter
under Diamond v. Chakrabarty.158
upheld only for claims directed to comparing or analyzing DNA sequences, because they
included no transformative steps and covered only ineligible abstract, mental steps. See
id. at 1334.
157
See id. at 1329 (“Thus, when cleaved, an isolated DNA molecule is not a purified
form of a natural material, but a distinct chemical entity.”).
158
More specifically, Judge Lourie opined that “[i]solated DNA has been cleaved (i.e.,
had covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a
fraction of the naturally occurring DNA molecule.” Id. at 1328. As such, this cleaving
and synthesizing “[imparts] on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity as
compared to native DNA.” Id.
Judge Kimberly Moore’s concurrence further distinguishes that the isolated cDNA falls
into a separate category since cDNA, although based on a naturally occurring RNA
template, is totally human engineered and has no naturally occurring counterpart. Id. at
1340–41 (Moore, J., concurring in part). “The claimed isolated cDNA sequences are the
creation of man, made using biological tools and the naturally occurring mRNA as a
template.” Id. at 1341 (Moore, J., concurring in part ).
For a recent article agreeing with Judges Lourie and Moore but putting a slightly different
spin on the Chakrabarty rule, see Janice M. Mueller, Facilitating Patient Access to
Patent-Protected Genetic Testing, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 83 (2011). In a thoughtprovoking piece, Professor Mueller disagrees with the Myriad district court and argues
that the Chakrabarty rule does not focus on the “marked difference” between the natural
product and the isolated, purified product, but instead simply requires that the isolated
product is the subject of human intervention or manipulation. Id. at 88. I find this
rationale problematic since the Court used the specific term “marked differences” in its
holding. In fact, crucial to the Chakrabarty court’s reasoning was the fact that Dr.
Chakrabarty’s bacteria could digest crude oil, a feature lacking in its naturally occurring
counterpart. This distinction is what aligns Chakrabarty with Funk Brothers. In Funk
Brothers, although the patentee manipulated and mixed several species of non-inhibitive
root-nodule bacteria, the end-product was patent-ineligible subject matter since the
human intervention did not result in a product that was biologically different from its
naturally occurring counterpart. Prof. Mueller argues that there is no need to align
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers since Chakrabarty was decided under Section 101’s
subject matter requirements and Funk Brothers decided on obviousness grounds.
Although the Funk Brothers court uses the language “lacks inventiveness,” its core
holding refers to the root-nodule material as “no more than . . . the handiwork of nature
and hence is not patentable.” Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
131 (1948). I would therefore suggest that at best, the Kalo patents were invalidated on
both subject matter, id. at 131, and obviousness grounds, id. at 442–43. I posit that it is
the subject matter rejection that parallels Chakrabarty. Myriad argues that isolated DNA
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As part of the Myriad opinion, Judge Lourie conceded that
biologists may legitimately take the contrary view that since the
basic isolated BRCA 1/2 genes have the same nucleotide sequence
as their “native counterparts” (and must have them to carry out the
invention’s utility of detecting genetic mutations linked to certain
breast and ovarian cancers), they are not markedly different and
thus are patent-ineligible products of nature under Section 101.159
Yet, Judge Lourie maintained the incentive-based argument that
the court must give great weight to the PTO’s long-standing
position since 2001 that isolated DNA molecules are patenteligible.160 Judge Kimberly Moore, in her concurring opinion,
agreed with Judge Lourie and reinforced the innovation-focused
She reasoned that
nature of the court’s conclusion.161
biotechnology companies have relied on these guidelines to
develop a significant genomic portfolio and that patent protection
for genomic material is crucial for continued innovation and
economic growth of the biotechnology industry.162
What is conspicuously absent from the Federal Circuit’s
analysis is any constitutional vetting of which view best promotes
progress, the “chemical compound” or “biological information”
patentability analysis. In April, the Supreme Court remanded the
Myriad case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its
opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus.163 In Mayo, the Court held that
access to basic research tools must be considered when evaluating
Section 101 subject-matter eligibility. In addition, the Court held
that Section 101’s bright-line test is applicable to all processes
involving laws of nature, even when the law of nature is novel.
is “markedly different” because it can be used in diagnostic tests or gene therapy, see
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1794
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-725), but this property is simply incident to the DNA being
ex vivo. The utility of the DNA lies in its naturally-occurring capability to encode
specific information.
159
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1330.
160
See id. at 1330–31.
161
See id. at 1347.
162
Id.
163
In Mayo, the court found that the process for correlating thiopurine metabolites with
dosage effectiveness and related harms from the thiopurine drug constituted patentineligible subject matter.
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Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit refused to back away from its
incentive-centered arguments and reaffirmed its opinion that
isolated BRCA 1/2 genes are patentable subject-matter.164 There is
only one substantive difference between the first and second
Federal Circuit opinions. In the opinion after remand, the Federal
Circuit was forced to distinguish Myriad from Mayo to avoid being
bound by this Supreme Court precedent.165 Judge Lourie achieved
this by arguing that unlike the correlating process in Mayo,
“permitting patents on isolated genes does not preempt a law of
nature.”166 He reasoned that isolated genes as compositions of
matter are more properly viewed as products of man, which often
follow a law of nature, but are not properly placed in the law of
nature exclusion evaluated by the Supreme Court in Mayo.167
Interestingly, Judge Bryson in his dissent draws the more
reasonable and proper analogy to Mayo: “Just as a patent involving
a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’ that does
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ a
patent involving a product of nature should have an inventive
concept that involves more than merely incidental changes to the
naturally occurring product.”168
Arguably, the Federal Circuit’s artificial distinction of Mayo
was central to sustaining the incentive-centered narrative. Indeed,
Judge Moore, in her concurrence after remand, expressly adopted
an incentive-focused view of how patents promote progress as part
of her argument to stay the course and follow the PTO Guidelines
that isolated genes, such as BRCA 1/2, are patentable.169 She uses
a quote from the Supreme Court’s earlier Festo opinion when
stating that:
The settled expectation of the biotechnology
industry—not to mention thousands of issued
patents—cannot be taken lightly and deserve

164

Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1331.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–97 (2012).
169
See id. at 1343–47 (Moore, J., concurring).
165
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deference. This outpouring of scientific creativity,
spurred by the patent system, reflects a substantial
investment of time and money by the biotechnology
industry to obtain property rights to DNA
sequences. The type of fundamental alteration in
the scope of patentable subject matter argued in this
case ‘risk[s] destroying the legitimate expectations
of inventors in their property.’170
I suggest that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to give the proper
deference to the Supreme Court upon remand, and its failure to
balance the potential harms to progress caused by patenting basic
research tools such as isolated genes, is a prime illustration of the
Court’s conservative pragmatic acceptance of the status quo.171
This course can only be corrected by moving toward a more
balanced “postmodern” view of progress.

III. MOVING TOWARD A MORE BALANCED “POSTMODERN” VIEW
OF PROGRESS
The condition of post-modernity is distinguished by
an evaporating of the ‘grand narrative’—the
overarching story-line by means of which we are
placed in history as beings having a definite past
and a predictable future. The post-modern outlook
sees a plurality of heterogeneous claims to
knowledge, in which science does not have a
privileged place.172

170

Id. at 1344 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shakes Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Col., 535 U.S.
722, 739 (2002)).
171
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F. 3d at 1348–58 (Bryon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 131
(emphasizing access to scientific knowledge as integral to progress); GIDDENS, supra
note 14, at 134–36 (outlining his theory on “pragmatic acceptance”); Menell, supra note
121, at 1300–01.
172
See GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 2 (1990).
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Postmodern “Progress,” therefore necessarily
changes the relatively undifferentiated incentive or
monopoly framework that characterizes current
intellectual property [patent] case lawFalse173 An
idea of progress that rejects sheer material growth
as its sine qua non changes the focus of our
intellectual property laws from competition policy
to the complicated interface between science and
society.174

A. Intellectual Property and Postmodern Progress
Despite the frequent assertion that the United States has been a
“postmodern” society since the 1960’s,175 Giddens counters that
we are really in the transition mode of “radicalized modernity,”
where we are questioning the status quo.176 As radicalized
modernists, we begin to see the weaknesses in each dimension of
modernity. We then evaluate our past and current behavior in each
dimension against current concerns such as humanism, world
peace and sustainability. For Giddens, we will not become a true
postmodern society until we affirmatively deconstruct the current
modernist dimensions of surveillance and control, industrialism,
capitalism and military power and replace them with the new
“contours” or dimensions of: 1) post-scarcity, rather than having a
“market-based” economy, there is a more equitable distribution of
wealth and resources (Under this paradigm, quality of life and
values are no longer centered on status and economic growth and
ultimately “scarcity” no longer exists for certain economicallydisadvantaged classes or groups. Giddens concedes that this is
more easily achieved in the “more affluent areas of the world.”);177
2) multi-layered democratic participation; 3) demilitarization; and

173

See Chon, supra note 19, at 125–26.
Id. at 145
175
GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 55–78; see also Sim, ed., supra note 14, at x; Smart, 59
note 60, at 12.
176
GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 149–50.
177
Id. at 165–67.
174
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4) a humanization of technology.178 To ultimately achieve this
“utopian” postmodernism, we must continue to radically engage
and challenge current legal and social constructs in light of the past
and future in order to determine which changes best effectuate a
better balance that helps negate the risks and harms created by
modernism.179
Margaret Chon, in her seminal article, “Postmodern Progress:
Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power,”180 places this
discussion in an intellectual property context and advocates
adopting a “postmodern” view of progress which would allow us
to evaluate Congress’s copyright and patent power “against a
complex context of disparities in control over knowledge rather
than simply against the provision of incentives to inventors.”181
Like Giddens, Chon describes modern progress as forwardmoving, with an eye toward economic and cultural growth, while
postmodernism “deconstructs the linear and forward nature of
‘Progress,’”182 and sometimes limits intellectual property rights if
limitations necessary to promote a sustainable ecosystem or
provide access to basic research.183 Without using sociological
terms such as “radical engagement” and “radicalized modernism,”
Chon argues that our modern incentive-driven views concerning
178

Id. at 163–65.
Id. at 177–78.
180
See Chon, supra note 19.
181
Id. at 133 (outlining the Framers’ and Americans’ awareness that they were
economically and culturally behind European nations and therefore believed that
regulating information and invention would contribute to improvement of America’s
socioeconomic and cultural status).
182
Id. at 101
183
Id.; see also id. at 125.
Yet, importantly, a postmodern “Progress” is not defined simply by
the eschewal of the grand story line of modern progress.
“Postmodern” progress is progress that is consistent with the
“bottom-up” approach of postmodernism, one that recognizes that
“progress”ive acts may be backward as well as forward, perhaps
sideways, and most often circular (as exemplified by the accelerated
reflexivity of knowledge).
Id. at 125 (quoting PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES:
INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 25 (1st ed. 1992); see also Chon, supra note 19, at
98 n.3 (“We are abroad in a world which is thoroughly constituted through reflexively
applied knowledge, but where at the same time we can never be sure that any given
element of that knowledge will not be revised.”); GIDDENS, supra note 14, at 39.
179
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intellectual property have prevented courts and Congress from
taking on the “Progress Project”— stepping back and carefully
reflecting on whether progress in the constitutional context means
more than simply incentivizing the production of knowledge to
achieve economic/industrial growth.184 In other words, did the
Framers actually have a broader “postmodern” view of progress
than the current incentive-centered paradigm would suggest, a
view in which access to knowledge was at least as significant as,
and possibly more significant than, incentivizing the production of
knowledge?185
Chon boldly posits that the constitutionally sound view of
promoting progress treats the goal of maintaining access to
knowledge as a more fundamental constitutional mandate than the
incentivizing of the creation of Science and the useful Arts.186
This broad and more balanced vision of progress requires courts to
replace the incentive-centered discussion with one that gives more
credibility to access issues. She discusses the computer software
cases of Computer Associates v. Altai and When Associates v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory as illustrative of the Supreme Court’s
“lack of vision with respect to this larger Progress project.”187
In establishing why a balanced view of progress is more
constitutionally sound, Chon notes the Framer’s original vision of
promoting “[l]ife, [l]iberty, and [t]he [p]ursuit of happiness” as the
basis of a modernist social construct wherein enlightened citizens
could build a strong nation-state utilizing the principles of
democracy, capitalism and industrialism and economic growth.
Central to this modernist construct was improving our
socioeconomic and cultural status to be on par with that of
European nations.188 The constitutional mandate of the IP clause
184
See Chon, supra note 19, at 117 (arguing that this is the essence of the 18th Century
Enlightenment Project. “This utopian [modernist] faith in progress produced an optimism
that knowledge will surely yield good results rather than bad, and improvements rather
than regressions.”).
185
See id. at 134–35.
186
See id. at 104 (“[T]extual evidence suggests that the incentives provided by
copyrights and patent are only second-order concerns which serve a higher purpose—the
“Progress” project—which preserves and nurtures a commons of knowledge.”).
187
Id. at 107–10.
188
Id. at 119–21.
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to develop a regulatory framework for patents and copyrights in
order to promote “progress in Science and the useful Arts” was
seen as aiding these modernist goals.
What courts and many scholars overlook, according to Chon, is
that the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison reflect
an equally strong desire that this clause not only incentivize the
creation of knowledge but preserve a “right of access” to this
knowledge.189 She carefully walks us through the Federalist
papers and establishes that although Madison was a vocal advocate
of a federal intellectual property scheme, he realized that there
must be a “public good” or “access to knowledge” included within
this property right.190 Chon points us to Federalist Paper No. 43,
where Madison states with respect to the patent and copyright
clause (IP clause) that “the public good fully coincides with the
claims of individuals.”191 Jefferson was even more adamant than
Madison about preserving free access to knowledge and went so
far as to propose an award system for authors and inventors, rather
than one granting federal intellectual property rights.192 Indeed, in
a letter to Madison during the drafting of the Constitution,
Jefferson indicates that he would have left the IP clause out of the
Constitution.193
Other commentators join Chon in inferring that Jefferson’s
agreement to support the IP clause was a compromise premised on
the clause’s inclusion of the dual limitations of only providing
rights that “promoted progress” and proving these rights for
“limited times.”194 Unlike Chon, however, these commentators
cite the Framer’s views and the ultimate compromise to
supplement their textual and structural arguments that the Progress
189

See id. at 104; see also id. at 134–43 (outlining how the works of Jefferson and
Madison compare).
190
See id. at 135–36.
191
See id. at 137 (quoting James Madison, Federalist Paper No. 43).
192
See id. at 140–44; Chon posits that one might infer from Jefferson’s reluctance, “the
notion that he valued the freedom to acquire knowledge” as more prominent property
right than providing a right to exclude. Id. at 143.
193
See e.g. Oliar, supra note 3, at 1786, citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (July 31st, 1788), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 476 (Phillip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
194
See e.g., Oliar, supra note 3, at 1777.
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portion of the IP clause expressly limits Congress’s intellectual
property power.195 Chon takes this premise one step further and
advocates that “promoting progress” goes beyond incentivizing
authors and inventors to increase knowledge, and includes the
fundamental right of each human to access that knowledge.196
Placing Chon’s arguments in the Giddens framework, her
thesis urges courts and Congress to become radicalized modernists
and challenge whether patent law currently promotes a balanced
and constitutionally sound view of progress. To do this, courts
must replace the incentive-centered narrative, which broadly draws
patent boundaries since patents per se promote progress, with a
narrative that considers “access to knowledge” when drawing the
boundaries surrounding this right. I posit that in Mayo v.
Prometheus, the Supreme Court begins to embrace the vision of
the Progress Project by acknowledging access to basic “buildingblock” research as a fundamental right which sometimes
supersedes the presumptive power of patents to incentivize
research.197
B. Mayo Collaborative Servs. Inc. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.198:
The Supreme Court takes a step towards postmodern progress
by restoring balance to Section 101’s subject-matter eligibility
requirements
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent in the Metabolite case,199
opined that it was a mistake for the Supreme Court to dismiss its
earlier writ of certiorari simply because the petitioners failed to
refer to the Section 101 subject-matter eligibility issue in its lower
court claims.200 He argued that clarifying the law in this area
“sooner rather than later” would work to the public’s benefit,
195

See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1349–50; Oliar, supra note 3, at 1781–84.
See Chon, supra note 19, at 144.
197
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012)
(“And so the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of
nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily
administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”).
198
Id.
199
See generally Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124
(2006).
200
Id at 132–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196
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particularly since it was already briefed and argued by the
parties.201
Like a voice in the wilderness, he ended by
admonishing the Court that it “could contribute to the important
ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to
whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced,
adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent
laws . . . embod[y].’”202 Unfortunately, it took several years and
an appeal after remand before the Court returned to this debate and
restored balance to Section 101’s subject-matter eligibility
requirements.
In Mayo Collaborative Services Inc. v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.,203 Prometheus Labs patented a process
measuring the relationship between metabolite levels in the blood
and the likelihood that a particular dosage of thiopurine204 is either
effective or harmful. Mayo Collaborative Services, a licensee of
the Prometheus patent, eventually developed its own improved
process for correlating thiopurine metabolite levels with the drug’s
efficacy.205 Prometheus sued Mayo for patent infringement and
Mayo counterclaimed that the patent was invalid since it
constituted patent-ineligible subject matter under Section 101 of
the Patent Act.206 The District court held that the patent was an
unpatentable product of nature since the additional steps were well
known.207 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the District
court, holding that the additional steps transformed the product of
nature into patent-eligible subject matter under the court’s

201

Id. at 134 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 138 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146 (1989)).
203
See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
204
Thiopurine is a drug used to treat a range of intestinal disorders such as Irritable
Bowel Syndrome (IBS). See id. at 1350.
205
Id. at 1290.
206
See id. at 1295–97.
207
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs, CIV. 04CV1200JAHRBB,
2008 WL 878910 at *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), rev’d, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
202
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“machine or transformation” test.208 Mayo then filed its first writ
of certiorari, which resulted in the Supreme Court remanding the
case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its
decision in Bilski v. Kappos,209 which limited the machine-ortransformation test to a clue, rather than the sole test case for
determining whether a process constitutes Section 101 patent
eligible subject matter.210 On remand, the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed its holding by stating that even using the machine-ortransformation test as a clue-the process claims “do not encompass
laws of nature or preempt natural correlations”211 and are patenteligible, since “they [the claims] transform the human body by
administering a thiopurine drug and transform the blood by
analyzing it to determine metabolite levels.”212 Mayo then filed a
second writ for certiorari which was granted by the Supreme
Court.213
Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous majority, reversed the
Federal Circuit and held that the process was patent-ineligible
subject matter since the additional steps fail to “transform[] the
unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those
laws.”214 I argue that the Supreme Court’s analysis and response
208
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
209
See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
210
Id. at 3226–27.
211
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
212
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302
(2012). The Federal Circuit analogized the Prometheus process to the process in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981), where the court held that the process
(software based) for molding uncured rubber using the Arrhenius equation was patent
eligible since it included significant post-solution activity in addition to the basic
mathematical algorithm, thus transforming the algorithm based process into patent
eligible subject matter.
213
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3027, 180 L. Ed. 2d
844 (2011).
214
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
Claim 1, for example, states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of
a patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug) exceed about 400
pmol per 8x10 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to
produce toxic side effects. While a human action (the administration
of the thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation of this relation in a
particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any
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to counter-arguments demonstrate a radicalized modernist
approach where the court radically engages the incentive-centered
paradigm and restores balance to evaluating patentability under
Section 101.
The Court begins the Mayo opinion using the traditional tools:
reciting the plain language of Section 101, then evaluating key
precedents that establish the common law basis for excluding laws
of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas since they are the
building blocks for scientific and technological work.215 The Court
acknowledges that its own precedent cautions against an overly
broad interpretation of the common law exclusion, since on some
level, every invention is based on a law of nature, natural
phenomena or abstract idea.216 For a process centered around a
law of nature to become patentable, however, it must include
enough additional steps to create an “‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”217 Steps that amount to
no more than insignificant post-solution activity cannot be used to
circumvent the law of nature exclusion.218
The law of nature raised in the Prometheus claims was the
relationship between concentrations of certain metabolites in the
blood and the likelihood that a particular drug dosage would either
be ineffective or cause harm.219 The Court breaks into three
categories the additional steps that went beyond reciting the

human action. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural
processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets
forth a natural law.
Id. at 1296–97.
215
Id. at 1293–94 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233–34 (2010); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Le Roy v. Tatham, 14
How. 156, 175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853); O’Reily v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–120, 14 L.Ed.
601 (1854); cf. Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841)).
216
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
217
Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 598 (1978)).
218
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218).
219
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296–97 (reciting the law of nature portion of claim 1: “[I]f
the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a patient who has taken a dose of a thiopurine drug)
exceed about 400 pmol per 8x10 red blood cells, then the administered dose is likely to
produce toxic side effects.”).
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excluded law of nature: 1) the administering steps, 2) the wherein
steps and 3) the determining steps.220 The Court outlines the basic
arguments for why each step as well as the combination fail to
transform the law of nature into patent-eligible subject matter.
First, the administering step did no more than identify the relevant
audience of doctors treating auto-immune diseases, which is well
known.221 Second, the determining step failed to transform the
process since instructing doctors or lab technicians to measure the
thiopurine metabolite level was obvious and already carried out for
some time in the field before the patent was issued.222 Third, the
wherein clause did no more than contextualize the relevant natural
laws and suggest its significance in treating patients.223 Last but
not least, even the combination of the three additional steps failed
to transform the Prometheus law of nature since it “add[ed]
nothing to the laws of nature that is not already present when the
laws are considered separately.”224
Justice Breyer then proceeded with a detailed Section 101
analysis based on the controlling precedents of Diehr and Flook.225
He artfully switched between the cases to illustrate how the
patentability of claim 1 of the Prometheus patent is weaker than
Diehr (where the additional steps of installing rubber in a press,
closing the mold, constantly determining the molds temperature,
recalculating the cure time using the law of nature and a digital
computer were not conventional, obvious or convention, so could
qualify as significant post-solution activity) and no stronger than
Flook (where the additional steps failed to transform the
unpatentable formula for computing an updated alarm limit never
provided details such as how to select the formula variables and
discussion of various chemical processes involved in the catalytic
conversion of hydrocarbons were all well-known and lacked an
220

Id. at 1297–98.
Id. at 1297.
222
Id. at 1297.
223
Id. at 1297–98 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 590 (1978), for support that
“purely conventional or obvious pre-solution activity is normally not sufficient to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
224
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981))
225
Id. at 1292, 1298–1300
221
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inventive concept).226 He used the British case of Neilson as
support for the proposition that adding a series of broad
conventional steps without inventive aspects cannot elevate a law
of nature into patent-eligible subject matter; and he used Bilski
and Benson as support for the view that limiting the process to one
particular field, such as treating intestinal focused autoimmune
disorders, is not enough to transform steps relating to a law of
nature into patent-eligible subject matter.
(Bilski’s claims
expressly limited use of the hedging formula to the commodities
and energy markets, and Benson’s binary conversion process was
limited to the then-new area of digital computers.)227
The Mayo opinion starts to radically engage the status quo
when it takes more than one or two sentences to discuss why the
policy of excluding laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract
ideas from qualifying as patent-eligible subject matter must extend
to newly discovered and innovative laws of nature, such as the
specific correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels and the
dosages outlined in the Prometheus patents. In other words, we
can no longer begin and end the discussion with the argument that
patents per se promote progress, so innovative processes must be
broadly evaluated under Section 101.228 The opinion begins by
noting that the Supreme Court in Benson, Flook and Bilski
articulated concerns that the patenting of such processes, no matter
how novel, would inhibit future innovation both within and outside
of the particular field.229
As part of its discussion, the Court conceded that while
rewarding patents for new processes centered around a law of
nature might in fact incentivize additional discoveries, there
remains the problem that society needs access to such laws and
226

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1300–02.
228
See generally id.
229
Id. at 1301; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 93 S. Ct. 253, 255 (1972) (noting that the
claims were “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the
[mathematical formula]”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct 3218, 3231 (2010) (pointing out
that to allow “petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in
all fields”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (expressing concern that the
claimed process was simply “a formula for computing an updated alarm limit,” which
might “cover a broad range of potential uses”).
227
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principles since they are the “basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”230 More specifically, the court cautions that
this danger is particularly acute when the “patented process
amounts to no more than an instruction to ‘apply a natural law,’ or
otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying
discovery could reasonably justify.”231 Unwilling to rely on
judicial precedent alone, the Court then cited numerous scholarly
articles that support this position and explain, for example, that
“exclusion from patent law of basic truths reflects ‘both . . . the
enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if
property rights could be obtained in them and . . . the enormous
transaction costs that would be imposed on would-be users [of
those truths].’”232
The argument remained that the narrow and specific nature of
the Prometheus claims would limit their ability to significantly
interfere with future innovation, so even a single step beyond the
basic law should be enough to cross over into Section 101
patentable subject matter.233 Justice Breyer countered by pointing
out that that even narrowly drawn laws of nature can inhibit
progress, and that courts are ill-equipped to distinguish among
different laws of nature.234 Thus, the better view is for courts to
apply the “bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature”
which serves as an adequate and user-friendly proxy for “the
underlying ‘building-block’ concern[s].”235
Next, the Court addressed the Government’s arguments that the
Section 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobviousness) and 112 (written
description/enablement) requirements perform adequate screening
230

Mayo, 132 S. Ct at 1301 (citing Benson, 93 S. Ct at 67).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (“One problem with [process] patents is that the more
abstractly their claims are stated, the more difficult it is to determine precisely what they
cover. They risk being applied to a wide range of situations that were not anticipated by
the patentee.”). Id. at 1302 (quoting C. BOHANNAN & H. HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, 12 (2012). See
generally Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, & Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315
(2011) (arguing that § 101 reflects this kind of concern).
232
Mayo, 132 S. Ct., at 1302 (citing W. Landes & R. Posner, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305–06 (2003)).
233
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
234
Id.
235
Id.
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functions for patentability, without the need for a separate Section
101 subject matter analysis.236 Adopting this view, according to
Justice Breyer, would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to
Section 101 patentability a dead letter.”237 He further reasons
Sections 102, 103 and 112 each have their own clearly articulated
screening function, which does not evaluate the “kind of risk that
underlies the law of nature exception, namely the risk that a patent
on the law would significantly impede future innovation.”238 Even
in those instances where there appears to be an overlap between
the Section 102 novelty and Section 101 patent-eligibility inquiry,
it is not enough to allow Section 102 to serve as a proxy for
Section 101 since this would create “significantly greater legal
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections [102, 103 and 112]
can do work that they are not equipped to do.”239
Justice Breyer further noted that nothing in the plain language
of Sections 102, 103 or 112 supports allowing them to serve as
proxies for Section 101, and that to allow these requirements to do
so would “create the kind of risk that underlies the law of nature
exception, namely the risk that a patent on the law would
significantly impede future innovation.”240
Justice Breyer
concluded by expressly holding that “[t]hese considerations lead us
to decline the Government’s invitation to substitute Sections 102,
103 and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under
Section 101.”241
This holding demonstrates the Court’s
willingness to radically engage the status quo, to draw the correct

236

Id. at 1303–04.
Id. at 1303.
238
Id. at 1304 (stating that “[t]he Government, however, suggests in effect that the
novelty of a component law of nature may be disregarded when evaluating the novelty of
the whole. . . . But §§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they
were part of the prior art when applying those sections.”). As to Sections 102 and 103,
Breyer notes that “studiously ignoring all laws of nature when evaluating a patent
application under §§ 102 and 103 would ‘make all inventions unpatentable because all
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which once known, make
their implementations obvious.’” Id. at 1304 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
189. n.12. (1981)).
239
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
240
Id.; see also Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008)
(defending a minimalist approach to Section 101).
241
Id.
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patentability boundaries and to restore the significance of Section
101 as the threshold test for patentability. Furthermore, implied in
an analysis that takes into account statutory language, incentivizing
research and access issues is a more balanced view of progress—
one where Section 101’s law of nature exclusion is carefully
evaluated to ensure access to basic research.242 This reflects one
giant step toward Chon’s postmodern “Progress Project,” where
the access right becomes as fundamental to promoting progress as
incentivizing new and useful natural laws.243
Further, the Mayo opinion concludes with Justice Breyer
revisiting the conflicting views concerning whether denying
patentability will interfere significantly with diagnostic research244
or prevent the creation of patent thickets so that “critical scientific
data that must remain widely available” for future discoveries is
indeed made available.245 He acknowledges that patent law has the
difficult task of balancing these competing interests across the
“many different fields of human endeavor.”246 Yet, Justice Breyer
concludes that it is better to stick with the “established general
rules” because a special rule to promote innovation for one
industry may produce “unforeseen results” or problems for
another.247 Breyer takes the last radicalized modernist or “Progress
Project” step by recognizing that it is well within Congress’s role
to create sui generis legislation or “more finely tailored rules where
necessary” to promote progress.248
The only instance where Justice Breyer’s virtually flawless
opinion falls short ]is that he fails to clearly articulate a connection
between the constitutional limitation “to promote progress” and

242

Id. at 1305.
See Chon, supra note 19, at 102–03; see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302–04.
244
Id. at 1304–05 (noting that this is the fourth argument raised by Prometheus Labs).
245
Id. (citing Brief for American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici Curiae 7).
The counter-argument of denying patentability to prevent patent thickets and promote
research was made by various Amici Curiae such as the AMA, AHA, AAMC and
Association for Medical Pathology. Id.
246
Id. at 1305.
247
Id.
248
See id. Because of this, Breyer ends the opinion by side-stepping the policy
evaluation of whether sui-generis legislation or “increased protection for discoveries of
diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” Id.
243
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how the limitation necessitates the “bright-line” law of nature
exclusion and restores balance to evaluating the law of nature
exclusion and Section 101 as the threshold test for patentability.249
As noted by Menell, “[t]he proper interpretive path for patentable
subject matter—from constitutional, jurisprudential, and pragmatic
standpoints—requires courts to integrate the constitutional and
jurisprudential traditions surrounding patentable subject matter
with principles of statutory construction and forthright recognition
of the challenges of applying historic doctrines to unforeseeable
technological developments.”250 Nevertheless, for the first time,
the Supreme Court does consider the impact of novel diagnostic
tools on innovation and access, and also includes both plain
language and jurisprudential analysis in its patentability evaluation.
This is a vast improvement over Bilski and many Federal Circuit
opinions. Moreover, despite the Court’s failure to specifically
mention the IP clause and its progress limitation, a more balanced
view of “promoting progress” is inherent in each of its arguments.
CONCLUSION
A radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to challenge
the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and
consider this narrative’s impact on future discoveries, humanism,
morality and the environment. In Mayo v. Prometheus, the
Supreme Court takes a step in the direction of postmodern progress
by restoring a balanced view of subject-matter eligibility and
leaving the door open for Congress to explore other paradigms for
protecting certain patent-ineligible subject matter.
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See Peter S. Menell, FORTY YEARS OF WONDERING IN THE WILDERNESS AND NO
CLOSER TO THE PROMISE LAND: BILSKI’S SUPERFICIAL TEXTUALISM AND THE MISSED
OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN PATENT LAW TO ITS TECHNOLOGY MOORING, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1289, 1307–08 (2011) (noting that “[b]y failing to explicate the framework for
delineating the scope of patentable subject matter or its contours, the Court shirked its
larger constitutional responsibility, thereby contributing to a pathological political
dynamic that undermines the patent system”).
250
Id. at 1308.

